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GUIDELINES FOR AVOIDING PITFALLS WHEN DRAFTING 
JUVENILE CURFEW LAWS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
ELYSE R. GROSSMAN* AND KATHLEEN S. HOKE** 
ABSTRACT 
Curfew laws seek to provide general protection to youth and adults by 
restricting the times that children of certain ages are allowed to occupy public 
places or streets. These laws often contain exemptions for youth accompanied 
by an adult, responding to an emergency, or traveling to or from school, work, 
or a religious service, among others. However, the actual language used and 
exemptions included vary by locality. As a result, courts have reached different 
results—several courts upheld curfew laws as constitutional, while others 
overturned these laws. Although not the original reason behind juvenile curfew 
enactment, several studies have found that juvenile curfew laws reduce other 
youth health consequences. For example, studies have shown that the 
enactment of a juvenile curfew law reduces juvenile traffic injuries and 
fatalities, pediatric transports and pediatric trauma transports, and the volume 
of juvenile trauma cases. Given that these laws have public health benefits and 
continue to be enacted across the country, this article will provide guidance for 
policymakers on how to propose and draft these laws to avoid problems in 
other similar statutes that resulted in them being overturned. A four-step 
framework by Harold Lasswell for understanding the creation of a policy 
called “The Policy Cycle” is used as structure for this article. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 12, 2011, two weeks after a fight ended in a stabbing, the people 
in Montgomery County, Maryland found themselves on opposing sides of a 
divisive issue: should the county enact a juvenile curfew law? Some of the 
county citizens argued against it: “Teen curfews . . . just punish all young 
people for the misdeeds of a few. What’s next, mandatory summer school for 
everyone because a few kids flunked English? . . . There are more substantial 
ways to combat crime and boredom, so long as we’re willing to find them.”1 
Others argued for it: “There’s an increase in gang violence . . . [of course] no 
one likes to have their freedom restricted . . . [but the curfew] helps the kids 
who are good kids . . . to get them out of harm’s way late at night.”2 
The bill, proposed by Montgomery County Executive Ike Leggett, would 
have restricted people under the age of eighteen from being out in public 
during certain hours.3 Legget and the Montgomery County Office of Public 
Information argued that a youth curfew would be “an additional method to 
improve the safety of juveniles, the safety of residents and visitors to our 
increasingly urbanized communities, and to reduce juvenile-related crimes.”4 
Several county advisory boards and other county groups as well as the 
Maryland Comptroller Peter Franchot and the Police Chief Tom Manger came 
out in support of the proposed law.5 On the other side were Councilmember 
and Chairman of the Montgomery County Council’s Public Safety Committee 
Phil Andrews, Councilmember Marc Elrich, other county groups, and a 
citizens’ group called “Stand Up to the Montgomery County Curfew."6 The 
bill was never voted on by the council and on December 6, 2011, lawmakers 
 
 1. Teens Need Things To Do, Not a Curfew, JUST UP THE PIKE (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.justupthepike.com/2011/07/teens-need-things-to-do-not-curfew.html. 
 2. Dan Reed, Some Seek Alternatives to Proposed Montgomery Curfew, GREATER 
GREATER WASHINGTON (Aug. 25, 2011), http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post/11812/some-
seek-alternatives-to-proposed-montgomery-curfew. 
 3. Cnty. Council, Expedited B. 25-11 (Montgomery Cnty., Md. 2011). 
 4. Frequently Asked Questions About the County Executive’s Youth Curfew Proposal, 
MONTGOMERY CNTY .OFFICE OF PUB. INFO., http://www6.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/ 
pdf/curfew.pdf (last visited April 21, 2014) [hereinafter FAQs About Curfew Proposal]. 
 5. See, e.g., Letter from Peter Franchot, Comptroller of Md., to Members of the 
Montgomery Cnty. Council (Sept. 13, 2011); see also Kristi Tousignant, East County Citizens 
Advisory Board Supports Teen Curfew, THEGAZETTE.NET (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.gazette.net/ 
article/20111006/NEWS/710069814/citizens-advisory-boardsupports-teencurfew&template=ga 
zette. 
 6. Dan Morse & Michael Laris, Montgomery County Debates Merits of Teen Curfew, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/montgomery-county-de 
bates-merits-of-teencurfew/2011/08/29/gIQAV3S0sJ_story.html; Full Council Tables Further 
Action on the Curfew, STAND UP TO MONTGOMERY COUNTY CURFEW (Dec. 6, 2011), 
https://sites.google.com/site/standuptothemococurfew/. 
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voted six to three to table the curfew bill until a future date.7 The bill has since 
died as a result of inaction. 
Part of what made the decision so difficult in Montgomery County is that 
the research on the effectiveness of curfew laws has been mixed. Much like in 
Maryland, the impetus for many of these laws is to reduce juvenile crime and 
victimization.8 In general, the premise behind curfew laws is that controlling 
the hours when young people can be out in public reduces their opportunities 
to commit or suffer from a crime and also limits their contact with potential 
victims and offenders.9 However, studies on whether curfew laws actually do 
reduce crime have reached inconsistent conclusions.10 
Some researchers have found that juvenile curfews reduce juvenile 
crime,11 the number of youth arrests,12 both violent and property crimes among 
youth,13 gang violence,14 total crime, and instances of burglary and robbery.15 
But others have found the opposite results, namely the enactment of a juvenile 
curfew did not reduce total crime,16 juvenile crime,17 juvenile arrest rates,18 
total victimization, or juvenile victimization.19 The latter set of studies appears 
 
 7. Victor Zapana, Montgomery Lawmakers Delay Action on Curfew, Approve Revised 
Tuition Assistance, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/mdpoli 
tics/montgomerylawmakers-delay-curfew-approve-revised-tuitionassistance/2011/12/02/gIQA9L 
vxaO_story.html. 
 8. David McDowall et al., The Impact of Youth Curfew Laws on Juvenile Crime Rates, 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY, Jan. 2000, at 76, 77. 
 9. Id. Cities across the U.S. have reported that they feel that their curfews have helped 
reduce crime on the streets and gang violence in their cities. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, A 
STATUS REPORT ON YOUTH CURFEWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 3 (1997). 
 10. See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text. 
 11. McDowall et al., supra note 8, at 84. 
 12. M.P. Gius, The Effects of Curfews on Juvenile Criminal Activity: An Individual-Level 
Analysis, 18 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 311, 312-13 (2011). 
 13. Patrick Kline, The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws on Arrests of Youth and Adults, 14 
AM. L. ECON. REV. 44, 59 (2011). 
 14. Eric J. Fritsch et al., Gang Suppression Through Saturation Patrol, Aggressive Curfew, 
and Truancy Control: A Quasi-Experimental Test of the Dallas Anti-Gang Initiative, CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY, Jan. 1999, at 122, 130. 
 15. A. Lee Hunt & Ken Weiner, The Impact of a Juvenile Curfew: Suppression and 
Displacement in Patterns of Juvenile Offenses, 5 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407, 408 (1977). 
 16. Mike A. Males, Vernon, Connecticut’s Juvenile Curfew: The Circumstances of Youths 
Cited and Effects on Crime, 11 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 254, 262, 265 (2000); Mike Males & 
Dan Macallair, An Analysis of Curfew Enforcement and Juvenile Crime in California, W. 
CRIMINOLOGY REV., Jan. 1999, at 1, 7 [hereinafter Analysis of Curfew Enforcement]. 
 17. Analysis of Curfew Enforcement, supra note 16, at 7; Danny Cole, The Effect of a 
Curfew Law on Juvenile Crime in Washington, D.C., 27 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 217, 222 (2003). 
 18. Richard D. Sutphen & Janet Ford, The Effectiveness and Enforcement of a Teen Curfew 
Law, J. OF SOC. & SOC. WELFARE, March 2001, at 55, 63. 
 19. K. Michael Reynolds et al., Do Juvenile Curfew Laws Work? A Time-Series Analysis of 
the New Orleans Law, 17 JUST. Q. 205, 212 (2000). 
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to have weaker analytic methods than the former set (e.g., few studies used 
multivariate regressions or nationally representative samples), but overall, the 
quality of the studies is limited and more research is needed.20 
Although not the original reason behind juvenile curfew enactment, several 
studies have found that juvenile curfew laws reduce other youth health 
consequences. For example, studies have shown that the enactment of a 
juvenile curfew law reduces juvenile traffic injuries and fatalities,21 pediatric 
transports and pediatric trauma transports,22 and the volume of juvenile trauma 
cases.23 Only one study has concluded otherwise, finding that a juvenile curfew 
did not reduce emergency medical service transports of injured youth, total 
homicide rates, or youth homicide rates.24 However, this last study had a 
restricted time sample (i.e., only three months before and after the enactment 
of a curfew law) and only used pre-post comparisons and chi-square 
distributions rather than a time series research design or a multivariate 
regression analytic method.25 
Another concern that opponents of juvenile curfew laws have raised in 
both Montgomery County26 and nationally27 is that these laws may be 
implemented in a discriminatory manner and result in racial profiling. This 
concern is supported by a 1999 study, which found that the curfew in San Jose 
was enforced disproportionately on Latino youth.28 When “compared to youth 
of other races/ethnicities, Latino youth [were] five times more likely to be 
arrested for curfew violations than their representation in the youth 
population.”29 Other people worry that police officers can use curfew laws to 
 
 20. Elyse R. Grossman, Are Teen Curfew Laws Effective? A Review of the Literature (Aug. 
2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, Baltimore County) (on file with 
author). 
 21. David T. Levy, The Effects of Driving Age, Driver Education, and Curfew Laws on 
Traffic Fatalities of 15-17 Year Olds, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 569, 572 (1988); David F. Preusser et al., 
The Effect of City Curfew Ordinances on Teenage Motor Vehicle Fatalities, 25 ACCIDENT 
ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 641, 644 (1993) [hereinafter Vehicle Fatalities]; David Preusser, City 
Curfew Ordinances and Teenage Motor Vehicle Injury, 22 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 
391, 397 (1991) [hereinafter Vehicle Injury]. 
 22. Steven J. Weiss et al., The Effect of a Curfew on Pediatric Out-of-Hospital EMS 
Responses, 2 PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 184, 187 (1998). 
 23. David V. Shatz et al., Effect of a Curfew Law on Juvenile Trauma, 47 J. TRAUMA: INJ., 
INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 1013, 1016 (1999). 
 24. Harry Moscovitz et al., The Washington, DC, Youth Curfew: Effect on Transports of 
Injured Youth and Homicides, 4 PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 294, 297 (2000). 
 25. Id. at 294-295. 
 26. Morse & Laris, supra note 6. 
 27. See, e.g., Ramon A. Vargas, New Orleans’ Curfew Enforcement Is Racially Biased, 
Ineffective, Critics Say; but NOPD Chief Disagrees, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2013/03/new_orleans_curfew_enforcement.html. 
 28. Analysis of Curfew Enforcement, supra note 16, at 19. 
 29. Id. 
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get around traditional search requirements by allowing officers to pat-down 
and search individuals solely based on their age and potential curfew 
violation.30 
Although Montgomery County remained divided on this issue, it is 
perhaps not that surprising as it is reminiscent of how United States (U.S.) 
courts have tackled cases dealing with juvenile curfew laws.31 In 1898, the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the curfew law in the city of 
Graham was “paternalistic, and . . . an invasion of the personal liberty of the 
citizen.”32 Since then, courts have been divided over the constitutionality of 
juvenile curfew laws.33 They have debated the proper level of scrutiny needed, 
including whether curfew laws infringe upon a fundamental right of either the 
juvenile or the parent, and the vagueness and overbreadth of these laws, among 
other issues.34 Some opinions strongly support and uphold curfew laws,35 
while others come down on the opposite side.36 Given that the Supreme Court 
has denied certiorari to hear juvenile curfew cases,37 it has been left up to the 
lower courts, which have thus reached varying conclusions. Some of the 
inconsistency in the opinions arises because these are state courts and state 
laws. 
Given that some of the research does support the effectiveness of juvenile 
curfew laws,38 and that many localities continue to enact these laws,39 it is 
 
 30. See Daytime Curfews, HSLDA, http://www.hslda.org/docs/nche/Issues/S/State_Daytime 
_Curfew.asp (last visited April 21, 2014) (presenting worries about daytime curfews but this may 
also apply to nighttime curfews as well); see also Letter from M.R. Deskins, East County Citizens 
Advisory Bd., to Montgomery Cnty. Council (Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www6.montgom 
erycountymd.gov/content/pdf/ECCAB_Curfew_ltr.pdf. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898). 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. See infra Part IV; see also City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d. 126, 128 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1966) (“We feel that curfew ordinances for minors are justified as necessary police 
regulations to control the presence of juveniles in public places at nighttime with the attendant 
risk of mischief, and that such ordinances promote the safety and good order of the community by 
reducing the incidence of juvenile criminal activity”). 
 36. See infra Part IV; see also People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d. 612, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975) (“[The] curfew law which restrains a segment of our society from freely walking the streets 
when no emergency exists is incompatible with the basic principles upon which free societies are 
founded. Since the curfew statute violates the basic spirits of a free society as well as the specific 
constitutional guarantees . . . it violates both the federal and state constitutions”). 
 37. See generally Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); 
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993); Schliefer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 
F.3d 843 (4th Circ. 1998). 
 38. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
 39. See William Ruefle & Kenneth M. Reynolds, Keep Them at Home: Juvenile Curfew 
Ordinances in 200 American Cities, 15 AM. J. POLICE 63, 63-84 (1996). 
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important for policymakers to draft these laws in such a way as to minimize 
their chances of getting overturned by the court. No statute can be written in 
such a manner as to guarantee that the courts will uphold it. However, one can 
learn from cases where the court has overturned a juvenile curfew ordinance 
and try to avoid problem areas pointed out in those cases. This article will start 
by giving a history of curfew laws, a summary of claims minors and parents 
have used to challenge curfew laws, and a history of cases involving curfew 
laws.40 Next, it will use a model for policymaking called the “Policy Cycle” to 
guide the recommendations offered for policymakers when drafting these 
laws.41 
II.  HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS 
Overall, curfew laws seek to provide general protection to youth and adults 
by restricting the times that children of certain ages are allowed to occupy 
public places or streets. These laws often contain exemptions for youth 
accompanied by an adult, responding to an emergency, or traveling to or from 
school, work, or a religious service, among others.42 The first curfew law was 
enacted in Omaha, Nebraska in 1880.43 In 1884, President Benjamin Harrison 
endorsed curfews, saying that they are “the most important municipal 
regulation for the protection of the children of American homes, from the vices 
of the street.”44 By 1900, over 3,000 U.S. jurisdictions had enacted youth 
curfews.45 During World War II, juvenile delinquency became a national 
concern again so juvenile curfew enforcement increased.46 After the war, the 
population boom led to an increase in the number of teenagers, which in turn 
led to an increase in the number of cities enacting juvenile curfews.47 By 1957, 
over half of the 109 cities with populations over 100,000 had juvenile curfews 
in place.48 
However, organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union began 
to challenge cities’ curfew laws arguing that they violated civil rights, 
especially the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.49 
Thus, many cities either “allowed enforcement of their laws to lapse or in some 
 
 40. See infra Parts II-IV. 
 41. See infra Part V. 
 42. Craig Hemmens & Katherine Bennet, Juvenile Curfews and the Courts: Judicial 
Response to a Not-So-New Crime Control Strategy, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 99, 111 (1999). 
 43. Id. at 100. 
 44. Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of Nocturnal Juvenile Crime. 107 U. PA. L. 
REV. 66, 66 n. 5 (1958); see also Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 42, at 100. 
 45. Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 42, at 100. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Kline, supra note 13, at 47. 
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cases actually repealed existing ordinances.”50 Things began to change again in 
1991 when Dallas, Texas enacted a new curfew ordinance that became a model 
for many American cities.51 It was narrowly tailored to apply to youth of 
certain ages during specific times and contained numerous carefully crafted 
exemptions.52 Other cities also started crafting their curfew ordinances in ways 
that withstood legal challenges.53 
In 1996, President Bill Clinton also endorsed curfews, explaining “[t]hey 
help keep our kids out of harm’s way . . . [and t]hey give parents a tool to 
impart discipline, respect and rules at an awkward and difficult time in 
children’s lives.”54 By 2009, seventy-eight of the ninety-two cities with 
populations over 180,000 (or eighty-four percent) had enacted youth curfews.55 
III.  CLAIMS CHALLENGING CURFEW LAWS BROUGHT BY MINORS AND 
PARENTS 
Both minors and parents have raised a variety of claims challenging curfew 
laws. These challenges include that the statutes are vague or overbroad, or that 
they violate minors’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, minors’ or 
parents’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, minors’ First Amendment 
freedoms of religion or assembly, or minors’ rights of interstate travel under 
the Commerce Clause. 
Two challenges that minors and parents often bring include vagueness56 
and overbreadth.57 A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and to provide an explicit 
standard for officers enforcing it.58 A statute is void for overbreadth when a 
law restricts a substantial amount of protected speech or conduct, and thus 
restricts other activities that in ordinary circumstances would be protected 
expressive or associational rights.59 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
includes two clauses—the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 48. 
 54. John Wildermuth, Clinton Backs Youth Curfews, He Proposes Teens Be Home by 8 PM, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 31, 1996), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/19 
96/05/31/MN3306.DTL&ao=all. 
 55. FAQs About Curfew Proposal, supra note 4; Tony Favro, Youth Curfews Popular With 
American Cities But Effectiveness and Legality Are Questioned, CITY MAYORS SOC’Y (July 21, 
2009), http://www.citymayors.com/society/usa-youth-curfews.html#Anchor-History-49575. 
 56. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 57. See infra Part V.B.2. 
 58. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999). 
 59. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029, 1038 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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Clause—that many minors and parents use as the basis for their challenges to 
curfew laws. Under the Due Process Clause, state and local government 
officials may not deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without 
reasonable legal protections (i.e., due process).60 Both minors and parents 
argue that curfew laws restrict both minors’ and parents’ liberty under this 
clause. Minors argue that curfew laws interfere with their ability to be out in 
public places, while parents argue that curfew laws interfere with their ability 
to raise their child without governmental interference.61 Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a state must provide equal protection under the law to all 
people within its jurisdiction.62 Under both clauses, courts use a high level of 
scrutiny to review the statute if the law infringes upon a fundamental right, 
which include the right to travel, the right to privacy, the right to vote, and all 
First Amendment rights.63 Courts have not reached a consensus on whether the 
“right to movement” is a fundamental right.64 
The First Amendment guarantees citizens the right to practice their religion 
without governmental interference, the right to assemble, and the right to 
unabridged speech or press.65 Minors have argued that curfew laws that 
contain few exceptions (such as the ability to attend a religious service, stay 
out late to vote at the polls,66 or attend a political rally) violate their First 
Amendment rights.67 The final challenge that minors have raised is that curfew 
laws restrict their rights of interstate travel under the Commerce Clause.68 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 61. See infra Parts IV, V.A, and V.B. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 63. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981); Dunn v. Blumstein, 
405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). 
 64. David A. Herman, Juvenile Curfews and the Breakdown of the Tiered Approach to 
Equal Protection, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1857, 1860-61 (2007) (noting that courts have struggled 
with ‘free movement’ claims related to curfew laws because these laws do “not fit neatly into the 
formal ‘tiers of scrutiny’ framework” and forcing them into the formal framework has led to 
“inconsistent results”). 
 65. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 66. Normally the right to vote would only apply to people ages eighteen years or older and 
thus this would not be an issue for minors affected by curfew laws. However, the court in City of 
Maquoketa v. Russell & Campbell specifically pointed out that “[t]he ordinance makes no 
exception for seventeen-year-olds who are eligible to vote at precinct caucuses. See IOWA CODE § 
43.91. In Iowa, caucuses traditionally are held in the evenings, and a seventeen-year-old returning 
home from such an event lasting beyond 11:00 p.m. would be in violation of the ordinance.” City 
of Maquoketa v. Russell & Campbell, 484 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Iowa 1992). 
 67. McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1984). 
 68. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1072 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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IV.  HISTORY OF CASES INVOLVING CURFEW LAWS 
The first case involving nighttime juvenile curfew laws was Ex parte 
McCarver in 1898.69 As discussed above, the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Texas found the curfew law unconstitutional and overturned it because it 
attempted “to usurp parental functions” and restricted the personal liberties of 
citizens.70 No court cases regarding juvenile curfew laws were reported until 
People v. Walton in 1945, in which the Superior Court of California upheld the 
curfew law in question.71 After that, courts reached different opinions about the 
constitutionality of these laws,72 until 1978. It would be another ten years and 
eight court cases before another case was reported where a court again upheld 
a curfew law.73 
One of the reasons for this gap was that the Supreme Court decided Bellotti 
v. Baird in 1979.74 The case examined a law that required minors to get 
parental consent for an abortion.75 The Supreme Court held that “a child, 
merely on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the 
Constitution.”76 Because the majority of the lower courts agreed that a curfew 
law would be unconstitutional if applied to adults, at first many of the lower 
courts used this decision to support their holdings that curfew laws were 
unconstitutional if also applied to youth.77 However, the Supreme Court in 
Bellotti also concluded that the “rights of children cannot be equated with 
those of adults.”78 It created a three-part test to help lower courts decide when 
the government could infringe upon the constitutional rights of children in a 
manner that would otherwise be unconstitutional if enforced upon adults.79 
Courts needed to examine: “[1.] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2.] their 
inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and [3.] the 
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”80 
 
 69. Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898). 
 70. Id. at 937. 
 71. People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 503 (Cal.App.2d Supp. 1945). 
 72. See, e.g., In the matter of Nancy C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747, 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) 
(holding that the juvenile curfew was not unconstitutionally overbroad). But see, e.g., Naprstek v. 
City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that the juvenile curfew was 
unconstitutionally vague). 
 73. See generally City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363 (Iowa 1989). 
 74. See generally Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 633. 
 77. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1073 (1981). 
 78. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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Overall, there have been forty-one cases reported examining the 
constitutionality of juvenile curfew laws,81 with twenty-five of them (or sixty 
percent) finding the laws to be unconstitutional.82 These cases have occurred in 
different courts (thirty-three in state83 and eight in federal84) all across the U.S. 
Cases where courts have upheld the juvenile curfew laws have occurred in 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, and West Virginia.85 Courts 
in Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington have overturned these laws.86 Because 
these are local laws, there are a few states that have both upheld and 
overturned different juvenile curfew laws in various cases. These include 
California, Florida, Iowa, and Ohio.87 So far, the Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari in three juvenile curfew law cases88 leaving ultimate authority to the 
states. 
 
 81. These cases only include those that debated the constitutionality of nighttime juvenile 
curfews and thus did not include cases, which dealt with daytime or emergency curfews. See, e.g., 
People v. Kearse, 295 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. 1968) (examining the constitutionality of an 
emergency curfew as applied to all citizens and thus not relevant to this analysis); see also City of 
Shreveport v. Brewer, 72 So.2d 308 (1954) (examining the constitutionality of a curfew applied 
to all citizens and thus not relevant to this analysis). Moreover, it also did not include cases that 
only mentioned the juvenile curfew law in passing and did not actually debate the 
constitutionality of it. See, e.g., In re Francis W., 42 Cal.App.3d 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) 
(mentioning the juvenile curfew ordinance as the reason the police officer stopped the car but 
focusing on whether the police officer was justified in stopping the vehicle and undertaking 
investigation and not on the constitutionality of the curfew ordinance itself). 
 82. See infra Table 1. The number forty-one includes two cases that were ultimately 
consolidated into one. Thus, the total number of cases could arguably be forty. However, for 
purposes of the discussions in this article, the total number of cases is forty-one. See State of 
Florida v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1106 (Fla. 2004) (where two cases were consolidated into one). 
See also infra Table 2 (setting forth the cases where courts found the juvenile curfew law 
constitutional). 
 83. See infra Table 3, Table 4. 
 84. See infra Table 5, Table 6. Of the eight court cases occurring in federal court, half of 
them (four cases) upheld the laws as constitutional. See infra Table 6. 
 85. See infra Table 4. 
 86. See infra Table 3. 
 87. See infra Table 3, Table 4. 
 88. In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bykofsky v. Borough of 
Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975). This was the first reported juvenile curfew 
ordinance to be challenged in a federal court and upheld by the Third Circuit under a rational 
basis scrutiny review. See Patryk J. Chudy, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting 
Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 527-29 (2000). 
In 1994, the Supreme Court again denied certiorari in Qutb v. Bartlett, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Circ. 
1993). This came after the Fifth Circuit had upheld a Dallas, Texas juvenile curfew ordinance 
under a strict scrutiny review. See Chudy, supra note 88, at 530, 533-36. In 1998, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari for the third time, in Schliefer by Schliefer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 
843 (4th Cir. 1998). This came after the Third Circuit again upheld a juvenile curfew ordinance – 
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V.  THE “POLICY CYCLE” AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS 
The Policy Cycle is a framework for understanding the creation of policy 
in this country and is based on work by Harold Lasswell.89 It is one of “the 
most widely applied frameworks” with a focus on “generic features of the 
policy process rather than on specific actors or institutions.”90 The Policy 
Cycle has four overarching steps (see figure one, below) that include: (1) 
Agenda Setting and Problem Identification, (2) Policy Formation and 
Decision-Making, (3) Policy Implementation, and (4) Evaluation and 
Termination.91 It is important for policymakers to have a general understanding 
of how policy is created and therefore this section will explain each of the four 
steps and give recommendations for drafting curfew laws as they apply to 
those steps. 
Figure 1: Harold Lasswell’s “Policy Cycle”92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A. Step 1: Agenda Setting and Problem Identification 
Under the first step, “Agenda Setting and Problem Identification,” the 
issue is recognized as a problem and brought to the attention of the 
 
this time under an intermediate scrutiny review. See Chudy, supra note 88, at 551-54. However, 
“[e]ven the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari cannot provide any guidance for the courts. 
Every time the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, the Court of Appeals . . . decision[s were] 
based on a different constitutional theory and therefore a different level of scrutiny.” Orly 
Jashinsky, Liberty For All? Juvenile Curfews: Always an Unconstitutional and Ineffective 
Solution, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 553 (2007). 
 89. HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: THEORY, POLITICS, AND METHODS 43 (F. 
Fischer, G.J. Miller, and M.S. Sidney, eds., 2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY]. 
 90. Id. at 45. 
 91. Id. at 45-53. 
 92. There are many diagrams of Harold Lasswell’s “Policy Cycle”. This one came from the 
New Zealand Ministry for the Environment website. See GERALD WILLIS, NEW ZEALAND 
MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, ME NO. 482, DRAFTING ISSUES, OBJECTIVES, POLICIES, AND 
METHODS IN REGIONAL POLICY STATEMENTS AND DISTRICT PLANS 3 (2003), available at 
https://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/drafting-issues-jul03/html/page2.html. 
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policymakers.93 Here, the problem would be high rates of crime and violence 
or other health consequences. Policymakers research the problem and consider 
different options and strategies such as the need for a juvenile curfew as a 
preventative measure.94 Given this, it is important that advocates of juvenile 
curfews conduct this research, and that it is reflected in the purpose or 
preamble provisions of the law. 
Recommendation 1: Conduct a study of juvenile crime and victimization rates 
prior to enacting the juvenile curfew ordinance and include it in the purpose 
section of the ordinance. 
As in Montgomery County, Maryland, politicians or advocates generally 
raise the issue of juvenile curfew laws after a violent incident or two have 
occurred. However, courts generally prefer statistics demonstrating a crime 
problem in the specific area rather than anecdotal stories or national data.95 
This issue often arises after the court’s decision on the proper level of scrutiny 
needed. 
There are three levels of scrutiny used by courts when evaluating the 
constitutionality of an ordinance. Under the most rigorous standard—strict 
scrutiny—“the classification created by the juvenile curfew ordinance must be 
narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest” and must be 
the least restrictive means available.96 Courts use strict scrutiny when a law 
implicates a fundamental right or suspect class. In juvenile curfew cases, 
minors and their parents argue that the fundamental rights implicated include 
the freedom of movement,97 the freedoms of speech, religion, or assembly as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment,98 or the freedom to travel as guaranteed 
by the Commerce Clause.99 Age is not considered a suspect class.100 Under the 
least rigorous standard—rational basis review—there needs to be “a rational 
relationship between the goals of the ordinance and the means chosen.”101 In 
between strict scrutiny and rational basis is intermediate scrutiny where “the 
ordinance [must be] ‘substantially related’ to the achievement of ‘important’ 
 
 93. Id. at 45. 
 94. Id. at 48. 
 95. See, e.g., Qutb. v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 493 (5th Cir.1993). 
 96. Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Circ. 1997), (citing Plyler 
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982)); see also Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 N.E.2d 832, 842 
(Mass. 2009). 
 97. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 N.E.2d 832, 842 (Mass. 2009). Since age is not a 
suspect class, Equal Protection arguments claiming that people under seventeen or eighteen are 
being treated differently than those over seventeen or eighteen generally fail. Id. 
 101. City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 369 (Iowa 1989). 
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government interests.”102 After the court decides on the proper level of 
scrutiny, it often looks at the data to determine whether the standard has been 
met. Whereas only a few statutes survive the strict scrutiny test, only a few fail 
the rational basis test. 
The court, in each of the forty-one cases reported, varied on which level of 
scrutiny it used to examine the constitutionality of juvenile curfew laws. The 
court did not always discuss which level of scrutiny it used, but in some cases 
it was possible to determine by the use of certain words, such as “compelling 
government interest” or “substantially related”. One-third (or fifteen) of the 
cases used strict scrutiny whereas only five cases used rational basis.103 Nine of 
the cases used intermediate scrutiny.104 The other twelve did not mention 
which level of scrutiny was used and it was impossible to determine from the 
language provided.105 
For example, in City of Sumner v. Walsh, a parent appealed after a court 
found him guilty of allowing his son to violate the Sumner juvenile curfew 
ordinance.106 Walsh argued that the ordinance violated the fundamental rights 
of minors and their parents.107 Although not mentioned in the majority opinion, 
the concurring judge discussed how there is a “fundamental right to move 
freely in public places” which is “rooted in the First Amendment’s protection 
of association and expression and in the fundamental liberties protected by the 
Fifth Amendment.”108 He pointed out that courts use strict scrutiny when an 
ordinance infringes upon a fundamental right.109 Moreover, he explained that 
even though the level of scrutiny used for a juvenile curfew ordinance is 
inconsistent across states, in the jurisdiction in question, strict scrutiny is 
used.110 Next, the judge commented on the need for evidence. He remarked: 
the dissent seems satisfied that state reports on the rise of juvenile crime, and 
national surveys on curfews, is sufficient evidence upon which a small 
community would be justified in imprisoning all children within their homes 
. . . I disagree with the dissent and would require some evidence that correlates 
directly [sic] with the specific problems of the specific community sought to be 
addressed by the ordinance.111 
 
 102. Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593, 598 (N.Y. 2009), (citing Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). 
 103. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 104. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 105. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 106. City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 1114 (Wash. 2003). 
 107. Id. (arguing also the law was void for vagueness). 
 108. Id. at 1118. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. City of Sumner, 61 P.3d at 1119. 
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Without this evidence, he could not find that the City of Sumner had a 
compelling interest in enacting a juvenile curfew ordinance that infringed upon 
the rights of the children and adults in the city.112 
In Qutb v. Strauss, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals “assume[d] without 
deciding” that the right to move about freely in public was a fundamental right 
and therefore used strict scrutiny on a Dallas juvenile curfew ordinance to 
determine if it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.113 The plaintiffs conceded that the state’s interest was compelling 
so the court had to decide if the curfew ordinance was narrowly tailored 
enough to achieve that interest.114 The court discussed the evidence that the 
city had put forward. It included statistics about: (a) how juvenile crime 
increases proportionally with age, (b) the increase in juvenile arrests between 
1989 and 1990 in Dallas, (c) the total number of juveniles arrested for murders, 
sex offenses, robberies, and aggravated assaults, and crimes against property 
before the curfew was enacted, and (d) how murders, aggravated assaults, 
robberies, and rapes are most likely to occur between certain hours at night and 
in public places.115 
Although the court found that the curfew ordinance was narrowly tailored 
and thus upheld the law,116 it still pointed out that “the city was unable to 
provide precise data concerning the number of juveniles who commit crimes 
during the curfew hours, or the number of juvenile victims of crimes 
committed during the curfew.”117 In a footnote, the court further pointed out 
that it would not “insist upon detailed studies of the precise severity, nature, 
and characteristics of the juvenile crime problem in analyzing whether the 
ordinance meets constitutional muster when it is conceded that the juvenile 
crime problem in Dallas constitutes a compelling state interest.”118 This, 
therefore, implies that more data might have been required had the plaintiffs 
not conceded this. 
In Anonymous v. City of Rochester, the Court of Appeals of New York 
explained its use of intermediate scrutiny: 
Rather than categorically applying strict scrutiny to a curfew which implicates 
a minor’s right to free movement simply because the same right, if possessed 
by an adult, would be fundamental, courts have found that intermediate 
scrutiny is better suited to address the complexities of curfew ordinances—it is 
sufficiently skeptical and probing to provide rigorous protection of 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1993). 
 114. Id. at 493. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 496. 
 117. Id. at 493. 
 118. Qutb, 11 F.3d at 493. 
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constitutional rights yet flexible enough to accommodate legislation that is 
carefully drafted to address the vulnerabilities particular to minors.119 
In this case, the court found that the City had not offered enough proof to show 
that the burdens imposed on minors by the curfew law were “substantially 
related” to the goals of protecting minors and preventing juvenile crime.120 The 
court explained that the crime statistics that the City did offer did not support 
the objectives of the ordinance.121 From the evidence, the court concluded that 
minors are more likely to commit crimes outside of curfew hours and that it is 
adults, rather than minors, who commit and are victims of the majority of 
crimes during curfew hours.122 Lastly, the court noted that “the methodology 
and scope of the statistics are plainly over-inclusive for purposes of studying 
the effectiveness of the curfew.”123 
After using the intermediate scrutiny standard to review the law, the 
District Court of Appeals of Florida upheld a juvenile curfew ordinance in 
State v. TM, AN, and DM.124 In that case, the circuit court had previously 
dismissed the case concluding that the juveniles’ parents had a fundamental 
right to raise their children without government intrusion.125 The State 
appealed and the district court readdressed each of the juveniles’ challenges to 
the ordinance, which included whether they had a fundamental right to freely 
move about in a public place or establishment at night without adult 
supervision.126 The court was satisfied with the evidence that the city provided 
which included data demonstrating how crime rates decreased after the 
implementation of the ordinance.127 However, the dissent disagreed, arguing 
that the “majority’s assessment of this justification for the ordinance [was] 
undermined by the lack of a meaningful factual basis.”128 The dissenting judge 
found that the evidence was irrelevant as it was compiled after the curfew went 
into effect.129 He questioned whether the city “had a particularly vexing 
juvenile crime problem when it decided to enact the curfew, whether the 
 
 119. Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593, 598 (N.Y. 2009). 
 120. Id. at 599. 
 121. Id. at 600. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. State of Florida v. T.M., D.N., & A.N., 761 So.2d 1140, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
 125. Id. at 1144. 
 126. Id. at 1145-46. They also challenged the ordinance as being unconstitutionally vague, 
overly broad, impermissibly inconsistent with the State model curfew statute and preempted by 
the State. Id. at 1144. 
 127. Id. at 1147. 
 128. State of Florida, 761 So.2d at. 1152 (Northcutt dissenting). 
 129. Id. 
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juvenile crime rate was increasing or decreasing, [and] whether crimes were 
being committed by a large number of youths or only by a relative few.”130 
B. Step 2: Policy Formation and Decision-Making 
During this stage of the policy cycle, “expressed problems, proposals, and 
demands are transformed into government programs. Policy formulation and 
adoption includes the definition of objectives—what should be achieved with 
the policy—and the consideration of different action alternatives.”131 In this 
case, it is important for policymakers to define terms, create exemptions, and 
discuss proper penalties as they draft juvenile curfew ordinances. 
Recommendation 2: Avoid the use of terms that are not defined. 
People have also challenged juvenile curfew ordinances on vagueness 
grounds. A statute is vague if it “does not give people of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct”132 and is worded “as to 
encourage arbitrary enforcement.”133 This problem often arises because 
legislators use imprecise words without providing definitions. 
For example, the Ohio court overturned a juvenile curfew ordinance in In 
Re Mosier as being unconstitutionally invalid for vagueness.134 The juvenile 
curfew ordinance in question prevented a minor from “remain[ing] in or upon 
any public place or establishment” during certain hours.135 The court pointed 
out that the ordinance lacked a preamble setting forth the purpose of the statute 
and a definitional section defining the terms used.136 Therefore, the court was 
forced to rely on the “standard dictionary definitions” of the words “remain” 
and “public place or establishment” to determine how to interpret the 
ordinance.137 The court also used the dictionary to define words in the 
exemption allowing a “minor upon an errand or other legitimate business 
directed by the minor’s parents.”138 Another exemption allowed the chief of 
police to grant permission to groups who wanted to hold late night activities. 
The court concluded the ordinance “provides no standards at all to guide the 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 89, at 48. 
 132. K.L.J. v. State of Florida, 581 So.2d 920, 921 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Papchristou v. City of Jacksonville, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972)). 
 133. Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 818 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 134. In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368, 368 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978). The Court also held that the 
ordinance deprived minors of fundamental rights under the First Amendment and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and was overly broad. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 370. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 371. 
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chief of police and leaves it up to his own personal predilections and beliefs 
. . . [t]his is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and is 
unconstitutionally vague.”139 
Although courts can sometimes rely on a secondary source such as a 
dictionary, to define a word, sometimes the word is just too vague. In Brown v. 
Ashton, the minors challenged four terms in the exemptions as vague: “bona 
fide organization,” “cultural, scholastic, athletic, or recreational activity,” 
“supervised,” and “gainful lawful employment.”140 The court found that the 
latter three terms were self-explanatory, but had trouble with the first term 
because “‘[b]ona fide’ is not explained in the ordinance, nor does the ordinance 
specify who is to say, and under what standards, an organization is to be 
regarded as ‘bona fide.”’141 This vagueness was one of the reasons that the 
court overturned this ordinance.142 
Similarly, in Betancourt v. Town of West New York, the Superior Court of 
New Jersey also overturned the ordinance because of vagueness.143 It held that 
terms such as “‘social events,’ ‘cultural events,’ ‘activities sponsored by a 
community organization,’ ‘direct transit,’ [and] ‘errand involving a medical 
emergency’” were vague and “open to differing interpretation by reasonable 
individuals.”144 Overall, the court found that “the ordinance’s silence opens the 
door to subjective police evaluation of what conduct is proscribed.”145 
Courts may also find a statute vague if it omits key terms. For example, in 
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, minors challenged the curfew ordinance as being 
unconstitutionally vague, because although it restricted youth from being out 
on the streets after 11:00 P.M. on Sundays through Thursdays and after 
midnight on Fridays and Saturdays, it did not specify an ending time for the 
curfew.146 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that it is this omission 
that made the ordinance void for vagueness.147 It concluded that “the lack of a 
termination time renders the ordinance susceptible to arbitrary, capricious and 
erratic enforcement, and therefore it is unconstitutional in its application.”148 
 
 139. In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d at 377. 
 140. Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599, 610 (Md. 1992). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 611. The court also concluded that the ordinance impinged upon minors’ 
fundamental rights and was not justified by any compelling governmental interest. Id. at 609. 
 143. Bentacourt v. Town of West New York, 769 A.2d 1065, 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001). Although the plaintiffs contended that the ordinance was invalid for a number of reasons, 
the court did not address all of the contentions because it found it to be unconstitutionally vague. 
Id. at 1068. 
 144. Id. at 1070. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 147. Id. at 818. 
 148. Id. 
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Many of the problems in each of these cases could have been resolved if 
the legislature had included a definitional section. In Bykofsky v. Borough of 
Middletown, a mother and her son challenged the curfew ordinance on a 
number of grounds including vagueness of terms.149 These terms included 
definitions for the words “borough,” “minor,” “parent,” “remain,” “street,” 
“time of night,” and “year of age.”150 Even with a definitional section, the 
district court still held that a few of the terms in the ordinance were 
unconstitutional due to vagueness.151 However, the court said that “the 
Constitution does not require impossible standards . . . while there must be 
definiteness and ascertainable standards so that men of common intelligence 
can apprehend the meaning of the ordinance, perfect precision is neither 
possible nor constitutionally required.”152 In the end, the statute survived the 
constitutional challenge and the court upheld it, finding that that majority of 
the statute was constitutional and requiring the removal of the few sections that 
it had stricken due to vagueness.153 
Recommendation 3: Avoid drafting statutes that are considered overly broad 
because they fail to include carefully crafted exemptions to the ordinance. 
Many of the juvenile curfew ordinances contain exemptions for situations 
where a minor may be out in public or on the streets after hours without 
violating the law. These exemptions fall into ten categories: if the minor was 
(1) upon an emergency errand, (2) upon an errand directed by the parent, 
guardian, or other adult, (3) attending or returning home from a meeting, 
entertainment, recreational activity, or dance, (4) in a public place for the 
specific purpose of exercising fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, 
religion, or assembly, (5) emancipated or married, (6) engaged in interstate 
travel, or (7) on the sidewalk in front of his house or his next-door neighbor’s 
house. The three most common exemptions were: (8) when minors were 
accompanied by a parent or guardian,154 (9) engaged in a lawful employment 
activity or going to or returning from his place of employment,155 or (10) 
 
 149. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1975). Other 
grounds included infringement upon the rights of minors to travel, the rights of minors under the 
First Amendment, the rights of minors under Equal Protection and the rights of parents to control 
the upbringing of their children. Id. In the end, the court upheld the law. Id. at 1266. 
 150. Id. at 1268. 
 151. Id. at 1249-52. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 152. Id. at 1253. 
 153. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. at 1266. 
 154. Forty of the forty-one cases (or ninety-eight percent) contained this exemption. See infra 
Table 7. 
 155. Twenty-six of the forty-one cases (or sixty-three percent) contained this exemption. See 
infra Table 7. 
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accompanied by another adult person.156 A few exemptions did not fall into 
any category and included situations such as where the minor was with his 
spouse,157 on “legitimate business,”158 or had obtained a specific permit.159 
Overall, the juvenile curfew ordinances that courts upheld were more 
likely to contain exemptions than the juvenile curfew ordinances that courts 
overturned. For example, fifty percent of ordinances found constitutional 
contained an exemption for when a minor was exercising a fundamental right 
compared to only twenty percent of ordinances found unconstitutional.160 The 
exemptions for when a minor was on an emergency errand or on the sidewalk 
were contained in sixty-three percent and thirty-eight percent of ordinances 
upheld, respectively, and in only forty percent and twelve percent of 
ordinances overturned.161 
The issue of the number and type of exemptions included arises when a 
minor or his parent argues that the ordinance in question is unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it infringes upon expressive or associational rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. To be void for overbreadth, an ordinance 
“sweeps a broad range of innocent behavior into the category of prohibited 
conduct.”162 Courts have thus used the presence or lack of exemptions to 
uphold or overturn juvenile curfew ordinances facing challenges of 
overbreadth. 
For example, in Johnson v. City of Opelousas, a minor and his mother 
asserted a broad challenge to the constitutionality of the curfew ordinance.163 
They claimed that the curfew ordinance was overly broad and violated the 
minor’s rights of freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of 
assembly, and freedom of religion under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, because the only exemptions to the juvenile curfew were for 
minors accompanied by a parent or “responsible adult” or on an emergency 
errand.164 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that under this law, a 
 
 156. This is usually someone that the parent / guardian has given permission to, but 
sometimes this is any person over the age of twenty-one. Twenty-nine of the forty-one cases (or 
seventy-one percent) contained this exemption. See infra Table 7. 
 157. In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385, 1386 (Haw. 1973). 
 158. See generally In the matter of Appeal in Maricopa Country, 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 159. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242, 1247 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
 160. See infra Table 8, Table 9. 
 161. See infra Table 8, Table 9. 
 162. McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381, 1384 (D.N.H. 1984). 
 163. Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th. Cir. 1981). 
 164. Id. at 1071. Other claims included that the law was vague and overbroad; violated the 
minor’s substantive due process rights to move freely under the Fourteenth Amendment; violated 
the parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children and guarantee family autonomy under 
the Fourteenth Amendment; violated the minor’s rights of interstate travel under the commerce 
clause; and, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1068. 
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minor is prohibited from engaging in a number of activities such as attending a 
religious event, school meeting, or organized dance, participating in legitimate 
employment, or just being on the sidewalk in front of his house.165 Although 
the court says that a curfew ordinance may be valid if narrowly drawn, in this 
case “since the absence of exceptions in the curfew ordinance precludes a 
narrowing construction, we are compelled to rule that the ordinance is 
constitutionally overbroad.”166 The same situation occurs in McCollester v. 
City of Keene, where the plaintiffs argued that the law was overbroad.167 There, 
the U.S. District Court found that because of the lack of exemptions, the 
ordinance “is so broadly drawn that it impermissibly curtails plaintiff 
juveniles’ personal liberty interest in free movement to pursue non-delinquent 
activities.”168 
In Ex parte McCarver, the juvenile curfew ordinance had only two 
exemptions for a minor including: accompaniment by his parents, or in search 
of the services of a physician.169 Although the Appeals Court of Texas 
acknowledged that there were these two exemptions, it pointed out several 
relevant exemptions that could have been included but were not. It argued that 
“so numerous do they occur to us as that they serve themselves to bring into 
question the reasonability of the law . . . .The rule laid down here is as rigid as 
under military law, and makes the tolling of the curfew bell equivalent to the 
drum taps of the camp.”170 In both Anonymous v. City of Rochester and 
Betancourt v. Town of West New York, the courts found that an exemption was 
missing, which was one of the reasons they overturned the juvenile curfew 
ordinance.171 In the former case, the Appeals Court of New York explained 
that if the laws had contained an exemption allowing for parental consent to 
activities of minors during curfew hours, “it would [have been] a closer case 
[because] courts have upheld curfews having, among other things, such an 
exception as only minimally intrusive upon the parent’s due process rights.”172 
In the latter case, the Superior Court of New Jersey found that the exemptions 
were “not broad enough to recognize the right of parents to permit their 
children to participate in many legitimate activities.”173 
In contrast, in City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, the Court of Appeals of Ohio 
found that ordinance was constitutionally valid when challenged by a parent 
 
 165. Id. at 1072. 
 166. Id. at 1074. 
 167. McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F. Supp. at 1383. 
 168. Id. at 1385. 
 169. Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936, 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898). 
 170. Id. at 937. 
 171. Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593, 601 (N.Y. 2009); Betancourt v. Town 
of West New York, 769 A.2d 1065, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 172. Anonymous, 915 N.E.2d at 601. 
 173. Betancourt, 769 A.2d at 1068. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] GUIDELINES FOR AVOIDING PITFALLS 321 
after he was found guilty of “allowing” his child to violate the juvenile curfew 
law.174 The court held that although the law did restrict “minors from being 
upon public streets or sidewalks during designated nighttime periods, the 
ordinance is not an absolute prohibition . . . exceptions are made . . . thus there 
is no curtailment of normal or necessary juvenile nighttime activities.”175 In In 
the Matter of Nancy C., the Court of Appeals of California addressed whether 
the curfew law as applied to a minor was unconstitutionally overbroad.176 It 
held that the presence of the exemptions included helped guide the police 
officers in determining if the minors were on the streets for a lawful 
purpose.177 Although the plaintiffs claimed that the juvenile curfew ordinance 
was overly broad in State of Florida v. T.M., A.N., and D.N., the curfew 
ordinance in question had nine exemptions.178 The Court of Appeals of Florida 
held that these exemptions would help the city achieve its goal of reducing 
juvenile crime and victimization because the exemptions “limit the scope of 
the curfew, thus ensuring that law enforcement focuses on those nocturnal 
activities which are most likely to lead to juvenile crime and victimization.”179 
Lastly, the U.S. District Court in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown 
upheld the juvenile curfew ordinance, finding that it did not unconstitutionally 
infringe upon minors’ rights to travel, minors’ rights under the First 
Amendment, parents’ rights to control the upbringing of their children, or 
minors’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause.180 Another court credits this 
to the fact that the Bykofsky law was a “very narrowly drawn ordinance of 
many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted.”181 
Recommendation 4: Avoid criminal sanctions in favor of civil ones. 
The juvenile curfew laws have a variety of different penalties for minors 
and parents who violate them.182 They may be faced with either criminal 
penalties or civil penalties. If it is a criminal disposition, minors may be: found 
guilty of a misdemeanor and sentenced to either community service or a 
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fine,183 adjudicated delinquent and transported to their homes or a holding 
facility,184 supervised by the Department of Juvenile Justice for a period of not 
over six months,185 or even sent to juvenile court for treatment, supervision, 
and rehabilitation.186 Parents may be found guilty of a misdemeanor and 
sentenced to community service, a fine, parenting classes,187 or subject to a jail 
sentence.188 If it is a civil disposition, minors may be given a warning and both 
minors and parents may be fined.189 Although twenty-two of the ordinances 
addressed in the forty-one cases contained specific penalty provisions,190 the 
court only examined this issue in three of the cases (of which two of these 
cases were later consolidated into one).191 
The issue of the proper penalty arose in Commonwealth v. Weston.192 In 
this case, several minors challenged a juvenile curfew law which restricted 
youth under seventeen years of age from “remain[ing], either on foot or in a 
vehicle, in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the 
City of Lowell during” the hours of 11:00 P.M. and 5:00 A.M.193 The law 
provided criminal disposition and noncriminal disposition penalties. A person 
who was arrested or charged with a criminal complaint, if found guilty, could 
be fined up to $300.194 In addition, a minor found guilty of violating a 
municipal ordinance may be adjudicated “a delinquent child” and even 
committed to the custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until age 
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eighteen.195 A person could also be penalized by a noncriminal disposition, in 
which case a police officer would issue them a “Notice to Appear” in court 
where they could be fined fifty dollars for each violation.196 The police officer 
would also forward the “Notice to Appear” in court to the parent or guardian of 
any minor “for informational purposes.”197 
In Weston, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts upheld the civil sanctions 
but overturned the criminal sanctions. Regarding the former, it concluded “that 
the ordinance’s civil enforcement mechanism is reasonable, balanced, and 
narrowly tailored, especially in light of the government’s need for flexibility 
when acting to protect children.”198 It discussed that the process that the officer 
must go through—i.e., stopping a minor suspected of violating the ordinance 
and asking for identification—was reasonable and acted as a deterrent to 
criminal activity itself.199 Moreover, repeated citations for curfew violations 
may prompt the Department of Social Services to get involved by alerting 
them to a minor who is in need of services.200 Lastly, the civil sanctions 
achieved its goals without creating a juvenile record and “insofar as . . . [it] 
does not provide for a minor’s arrest, it reflects a proper balancing of the 
minor’s liberty interest with the public interest, and ensures that such 
intrusions will not become a tool of harassment.”201 
However, it also concluded that “the criminal prosecution of a minor, with 
its potential for commitment to DYS, is an extraordinary and unnecessary 
response to what is essentially a status offense, and is contrary to the State’s 
treatment of similar conduct.”202 The court pointed to the Child In Need of 
Services (CHINS) statute, which also deals with status offenses by minors and 
where the legislature had specifically rejected criminal sanctions. The CHINS 
statute provides “that it must ‘be liberally construed so that . . . [children] shall 
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be treated, not as criminals but as children in need of aid, encouragement and 
guidance.’”203 The court found that the juvenile curfew law criminal 
disposition penalties went completely against this sentiment.204 Lastly, the 
court held that the State had failed to show how the criminal penalties were 
necessary given the effect of the civil penalties.205 
Curfew laws in both Pinellas Bay and Tampa also imposed criminal 
sanctions upon minors who violated them.206 In Pinellas Bay, a juvenile could 
be criminally charged on his second violation of the ordinance.207 If found 
guilty, he could be adjudicated as a “delinquent child,” fined up to $500, and 
supervised or committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for up to six 
months.208 The Tampa law was the same except it permitted a fine of up to 
$1,000.209 
In State of Florida v. J.P. & T.M., the Supreme Court of Florida addressed 
the issue of criminal penalties for both cities’ laws. The court found the 
criminal penalties to be “the most troubling aspect of its strict scrutiny review,” 
especially when compared to the model juvenile curfew ordinance enacted by 
the Florida legislature, which only imposed a civil penalty of fifty dollars for 
the second and subsequent violations.210 The court affirmed the opinion by the 
court of appeals, which “concluded that these criminal penalties indicate that 
the . . . ordinance does not use the least intrusive means to accomplish its 
purpose, especially when viewed against the model ordinance which 
accomplishes the same goal with only a civil penalty.”211 Lastly, the court 
pointed out that other juvenile curfew laws courts have upheld mostly imposed 
civil fines or community service requirements.212 
Overall, it seems that courts are less likely to uphold juvenile curfew 
ordinances that contain criminal penalties rather than civil penalties. Once 
again, there is no guarantee and a court tomorrow could uphold an ordinance 
with criminal sanctions and overturn an ordinance with civil sanctions.213 
However, by including civil penalties this also helps address the 
implementation issues discussed previously.214 For example, the police cannot 
use curfew laws as an excuse to arrest people. In addition, even if enforced 
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unfairly, it prevents targeted youth from obtaining criminal records that they 
otherwise might not have had. 
C. Step 3: Policy Implementation 
This next step, called Policy Implementation, includes the “execution or 
enforcement of a policy by the responsible institutions and organizations that 
are often, but not always, part of the public sector.”215 Laurence J. O’Toole 
broadly defined Policy Implementation as “what happens between the 
establishment of an apparent intention on the part of government to do 
something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of 
action.”216 Policymakers should draft sections including proper enforcement 
and severability clauses in order to help ensure that juvenile curfews are 
implemented in a fair and just manner. 
Recommendation 5: Avoid a discriminatory impact in implementation by 
considering the inclusion of enforcement mechanisms in the statute. 
Even when policymakers have the best of intentions, curfew ordinances 
can still be implemented poorly, resulting in discrimination and unfair 
enforcement. To prevent this, curfew ordinances should be applied city-wide, 
rather than only in certain neighborhoods, and should contain clear 
enforcement provisions so that police officers know how to implement these 
laws fairly. This recommendation is based mostly on research from social 
scientists,217 as few of the courts have addressed this issue yet. 
Several of the juvenile curfew ordinances contained clear enforcement 
provisions. For example, in Commonwealth v. Weston, the police officer must 
first speak with the suspect before taking any enforcement action and must ask: 
the apparent offender’s age and reason for being in the public place, or on the 
premises of an establishment. The officer shall not make an arrest or issue a 
notice to appear . . . unless the officer reasonably believes that an offense has 
occurred and that . . . no defense . . . is applicable.218 
The court found that these enforcement provisions “ensure[d] the safety of the 
minor and the safety of the public.”219 In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, a 
police officer who found a minor in violation of the curfew law had to take the 
minor to the Borough Police Station and immediately notify the minor’s 
parents.220 The law itself explains that: 
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this is intended to permit ascertainment, under constitutional safeguards, of 
relevant facts, and to centralize responsibility in the sergeant there and then on 
duty for accurate, effective, fair, impartial, and uniform enforcement, and 
recording, thus making available experienced supervisory personnel, the best 
of facilities and access to information and records.221 
Enforcement provisions were present in other juvenile curfew ordinances 
even though courts neglected to discuss them and their importance. For 
example, in City of Panora v. Simmons, the enforcement section authorized 
any on-duty city peace officer to arrest any minor who violates the curfew 
ordinance and “upon arrest, [to return] the minor . . . to the custody of the 
parent, guardian or other person charged with the care and custody of the 
minor.”222 In Hutchins v. D.C., a police officer should start by “questioning an 
apparent offender to determine his age and reason for being in a public 
place.”223 Then, if the: 
police officer reasonably believes that an offense has occurred under the 
curfew law and that no defense exists, the minor will be detained by the police 
and then released into the custody of the minor’s parent, guardian, or an adult 
acting in loco parentis [sic]. If no one claims responsibility for the minor, the 
minor may be taken either to his residence or placed into the custody of the 
Family Services Administration until 6:00 a.m. the following morning.224 
In Qutb v. Strauss, “the ordinance requires police officers to ask the age of the 
apparent offender, and to inquire into the reasons for being in a public place 
during curfew hours before taking any enforcement action.”225 Only if the 
officer believes that the person has violated the juvenile curfew ordinance and 
that no defenses apply, may the officer then issue a citation or make an 
arrest.226 
Although all of these may not be ideal enforcement provisions, at least 
some guidance is provided to the police officers implementing these 
ordinances. In contrast, the ordinance in S.W. v. State of Florida did not 
contain detailed enforcement provisions, but merely said that a child may be 
out on the street if the chief of police had granted him a written permit.227 The 
court found “[t]he provision authorizing the police chief to make a special 
exception lacks sufficient guidelines within which to exercise his authority;” 
“[i]t bristles with the potential for selective enforcement.”228 
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Recommendation 6: Include a severability clause. 
A severability clause in a law is a section stating that if any other section of 
the law is found void for any reason then it can be separated from the law and 
removed without the court needing to overturn the entire law.229 Of the 
juvenile curfew laws that were challenged in court, only three of them 
contained severability clauses.230 Although courts found problems in the 
language of the juvenile curfew laws, the severability clauses allowed them to 
strike that language while still finding the laws constitutional.231 
For example, in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, the court explained 
“the ordinance states that a constitutional construction is intended and shall be 
given . . . [and] contains a very specific and detailed severability provision 
which states that severability is intended throughout and within the provisions 
of the ordinance.”232 Therefore, when the court found that the words “normal 
nighttime activities” and “consistent with the public interest” were 
unconstitutionally vague, it deleted them and found that the section “as so 
modified, pursuant to the severability provisions of the ordinance, [was] 
constitutional.”233 
D. Step 4: Evaluation and Termination 
During this final step, “policy-making should be appraised against 
intended objectives and impacts.”234 Policymakers should evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policy in question and amend or even terminate it as 
necessary.235 However, “evaluation studies are not restricted to a particular 
stage in the policy cycle; instead, the perspective is applied to the whole 
policy-making process and from different perspectives in terms of timing (ex 
ante, ex post).”236 In other words, good policies provide for evaluations 
throughout the length of the policy so that an ineffective policy does not 
remain unaltered for long.237 
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Recommendation 7: Include a section ensuring that the law is evaluated 
regularly and updated accordingly. 
Although courts do not spend much time discussing whether the 
ordinances need to include regular evaluations and amendments, many public 
policy researchers have remarked upon the importance of policy evaluation in 
general.238 Moreover, the three ordinances that included such provisions were 
all upheld by courts.239 On one hand, this may be a coincidence. However, by 
having procedures to deal with vague or unclear language, it is also possible 
that people may avoid challenging these ordinances in court, as there are 
alternative procedures in place. 
In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middleton, the juvenile curfew ordinance had 
two in-depth sections discussing continuing evaluation and amendments of the 
law. Under the first section, it authorized the Mayor “to give advisory 
opinions, in writing or immediately reduced to writing, which shall be binding, 
and shall be adhered to by the police, until the ordinance is amended in such 
respect, interpreting terms, phrases, parts or any provisions.”240 The advisory 
opinions should be in response to questions dealing with language or conduct 
deemed “(a) ambiguous, (b) as having a potential chilling effect on 
constitutional rights specifically invoked, or (c) as otherwise invalid.”241 
Moreover, “this administrative remedy must be exhausted prior to presenting 
to any court a question in any of [the] three categories.”242 The court found that 
these mayoral advisory opinions provided “a means for the citizenry to 
determine officially in any given factual situation what is prohibited.”243 The 
second section authorizes the city council to continue its evaluation and 
updating of the curfew ordinance. To this end, the city council shall gather all 
exceptional cases, notices of school and other activities, and all mayoral 
advisory opinions and use them “in further updating and continuing evaluation 
of the Curfew Ordinance.”244 
Although not discussed in the court opinions, ordinances in both Schliefer 
v. City of Charlottesville and Qutb v. Strauss included evaluation provisions.245 
In the former case, within one year after the ordinance took effect “the City 
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Manager shall review [it] and report and make recommendations to the City 
Council concerning the effectiveness of and continuing need for the 
ordinance.”246 The report shall specifically include: 
(a) the practicality of enforcing the ordinance and any problems with 
enforcement identified by the Police Department; (b) the impact and cost of the 
ordinance; (c) other data and information which the Police Department 
believes to be relevant in assessing the effectiveness of the curfew ordinance; 
and (d) information from citizens regarding whether the ordinance has been 
administered and enforced fairly, including information regarding the age, 
gender and race of those charged or detained under the ordinance.247 
In the latter case, the city manager shall review the ordinance and make 
recommendations in a report to the city council within six months after initial 
enforcement.248 The report shall include: “[a] the practicality of enforcing the 
ordinance and any problems with enforcement identified by the police 
department; [b] the impact of the ordinance on crime statistics; [c] the number 
of persons successfully prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance; and [d] the 
city’s net cost of enforcing the ordinance.”249 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the varying opinions on the issues from both the 
stakeholders in Montgomery County, Maryland and this country’s courts, the 
enactment of a juvenile curfew law is a complicated endeavor. However, the 
evidence from social scientists seems to suggest that it is a worthwhile one.250 
Therefore, the juvenile curfew ordinances need to be written in such a manner 
as to prevent courts from overturning them on the grounds of vagueness, 
overbreadth, equal protection or infringement of fundamental rights of either 
the juveniles or the parents. This article hopefully provides recommendations 
for policymakers which do just that, and include: (a) conduct a study of 
juvenile crime and victimization prior to enacting the ordinance and include it 
in a purpose section of the ordinance, (b) avoid the use of terms that are not 
defined, (c) avoid drafting statutes that are considered overly broad because 
they fail to include carefully crafted exemptions, (d) avoid criminal sanctions 
in favor of civil ones, (e) avoid a discriminatory impact in implementation by 
considering the inclusion of enforcement mechanisms in a statute, (f) include a 
severability clause, and (g) include a section ensuring that the law is evaluated 
regularly and updated accordingly. 
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Obviously though, the issues behind juvenile curfew laws are part of a 
global problem and are much more complicated than the simple worry that a 
child is just “out too late.” It has to do with how parents are raising their 
children and what issues exist in the children’s home life. For example, is there 
parental supervision and monitoring? Do the parent(s) work late while the 
children are left alone? Does the child have other disciplinary problems? All of 
these issues, among a wide range of others, factor into a juvenile’s likelihood 
of being a perpetrator or victim of a crime.251 And by being out on the streets 
and in other public places late at night, juveniles’ risks of being involved in 
traumas, traffic injuries, and traffic fatalities are also increased.252 Any of these 
problems may lead a community to consider enacting a juvenile curfew 
ordinance. 
Given the complicated nature behind juvenile curfew laws, it is important 
that these laws are part of a broader enforcement strategy. It is not enough to 
simply enact these laws. Policymakers and police departments must work with 
parents so they understand why these laws are enacted and what they, as 
parents, can do to help. The goal is not to simply arrest children, give them 
criminal records, and then release them to break the law again, but rather, to 
work as a community to reduce the underlying problems mentioned above. 
One way to accomplish this goal is for the police to work with other state 
departments to create curfew centers for the children to be brought to instead 
of bringing them to the police station. For example, in Baltimore, Maryland, 
the police and the Department of Juvenile Services have teamed up and created 
curfew centers that offer counseling and support services to these juveniles and 
their families.253 
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 253. OFFICE OF MAYOR STEPHANIE RAWLINGS-BLAKE, MAYOR RAWLINGS-BLAKE 
ANNOUNCES OPENING OF SUMMER CURFEW CENTER (June 14, 2011), available at http://ar 
chive.baltimorecity.gov/OfficeoftheMayor/NewsMedia/tabid/66/ID/2979/Mayor_Rawlings-Blake 
_Announces_Opening_of_Summer_Curfew_Center.aspx; G. Gately, Baltimore’s Newly 
Approved Youth Curfew Among Strictest in Nation, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
(June 16, 2014), http://jjie.org/baltimores-newly-approved-youth-curfew-among-strictest-in-na 
tion/. As of June 2, 2014, the Baltimore City Council passed a much stronger curfew law. 
However, it still plans to have Curfew Centers which will “be staffed by employees and 
volunteers who will strive to identify youth and family needs that could be addressed by state, 
city or community health, mental health and social services providers.” Id. 
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In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, the law itself provides for this type 
of community engagement and teamwork. It instructs the mayor and relevant 
committees of the Borough Council to: 
work with existing . . . [or organize new] voluntary groups, and stimulate 
volunteer leadership, in programs of research and of action dealing 
constructively on neighborhood and local bases, with juvenile delinquency, 
and the prevention, control or containment therefore, in all its ramifications 
and with practicable steps toward the good life, and a better life, for minors 17 
or less years of age.254 
All in all, although juvenile curfew ordinances are complicated, they seem 
to be effective. Therefore, policymakers need to draft these laws in such a way 
as to avoid problems in other similar statutes that resulted in them being 
overturned. 
  
 
 254. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1272-73 (M.D. Pa. 1975). 
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TABLE 1 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Unconstitutional – By Case 
 LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
CASE NAME SS RB Inter. N/A 
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1898) 
   X 
Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., 
Butte County, 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1957) 
   X 
Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City, 
487 P.2d 74 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
   X 
In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973)    X 
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059 
(Wash. 1973) 
   X 
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d 
Cir. 1976) 
X    
In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1978) X    
W.J.W. v. State of Florida 356 So.2d 48 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1978) 
   X 
McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.Supp 1381 
(D.N.H. 1984) 
X    
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 
(5th Cir. 1981) 
  X  
T.F. v. State of Florida, 431 So.2d 342 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1983) 
   X 
S.W. v. State of Florida, 431 So.2d 339 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) 
   X 
City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67 
(Wadsworth Municipal Court, Ohio 1987) 
X    
In re Frank O., 201 Cal.App.3d 1041 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988) 
   X 
K.L.J. v. State of Florida, 581 So.2d 920 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) 
X    
Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599 (Md. 1992) X    
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 
935 (9th Cir. 1997) 
X    
Betancourt v. Town of West New York, 769 
A.2d 1065 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
   X 
Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003)   X  
*State of Florida v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 
2004) 
XX    
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City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111 (Wash. 
2004) 
X    
Hodgkins v. Peterson (not reported in 
F.Supp.2d) 
No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 2004 WL 1854194 
(S.D. Ind. July 23, 2004) 
  X  
Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 
593 (N.Y.2009) 
  X  
City of Maquoketa v. Russell & Campbell, 484 
N.W.2d 179 (Iowa 2009) 
X    
*Two cases consolidated into one and counted as two cases 
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TABLE 2 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Constitutional – By Case 
 LEVEL OF SCRUTINY 
CASE NAME SS RB Inter. N/A 
People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 503 
(Cal.App.2d Supp. 1945) 
 X   
City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1966) 
   X 
In the matter of Nancy C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) 
 X   
People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1975) 
   X 
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 
F.Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) 
 X   
People in Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Col. 
1989) 
X    
City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363 
(Iowa 1989) 
 X   
Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 
12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) 
   X 
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993) X    
In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Country, 
887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
  X  
Schliefer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 
159 F.3d 843 (4th Circ. 1998) 
  X  
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) 
  X  
State v. T.M., A.N. & D.N., 761 So.2d 1140 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
  X  
Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446 (W.Va. 2000)   X  
**Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 N.E.2d 832 
(Mass. 2009) 
X    
State of Idaho v. John Doe, 231 P.3d 1016 (Id. 
2010) 
X    
**Criminal penalty provision found unconstitutional 
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TABLE 3 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Unconstitutional – By State 
STATE CASE NAME 
***California Alves v. Justice Court of Chico Judicial Dist., Butte 
County, 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) 
 In re Frank O., 201 Cal.App.3d 1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988)  
***Florida W.J.W. v. State of Florida 356 So.2d 48 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1978) 
 T.F. v. State of Florida, 431 So.2d 342 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1983) 
 S.W. v. State of Florida, 431 So.2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) 
 K.L.J. v. State of Florida, 581 So.2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) 
 *State of Florida v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 2004) 
Hawaii In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 1973) 
Indiana Hodgkins v. Peterson (not reported in F.Supp.2d) 
No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 2004 WL 1854194 (S.D. 
Ind. July 23, 2004) 
***Iowa City of Maquoketa v. Russell & Campbell, 484 N.W.2d 
179 (Iowa 2009) 
Maryland Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599 (Md. 1992) 
New Hampshire McCollester v. City of Keene, 586 F.Supp 1381 (D.N.H. 
1984) 
New Jersey Betancourt v. Town of West New York, 769 A.2d 1065 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
New York Anonymous v. City of Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593 
(N.Y.2009) 
***Ohio In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio C.P. 1978) 
 City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67 
(Wadsworth Municipal Court, Ohio 1987) 
Oklahoma Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 
74 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
Texas Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) 
Washington City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973) 
 City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111 (Wash. 2004) 
*Two cases consolidated into one and counted as two cases 
***State has found juvenile curfew ordinances both unconstitutional and 
constitutional 
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TABLE 4 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Constitutional – By State 
STATE CASE NAME 
Arizona In the Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Country, 887 P.2d 
599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
***California People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 503 (Cal.App.2d Supp. 
1945) 
 In the matter of Nancy C., 28 Cal. App. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1972) 
Colorado People in Interest of J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Col. 1989) 
***Florida State v. T.M., A.N. & D.N., 761 So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) 
Idaho State of Idaho v. John Doe, 231 P.3d 1016 (Id. 2010) 
Illinois People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) 
 Village of Deerfield v. Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) 
***Iowa City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 
1989) 
Massachusetts **Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 
2009)  
Ohio City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1966) 
West Virginia Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446 (W.Va. 2000) 
**Criminal penalty provision found unconstitutional 
***State has found juvenile curfew ordinances both unconstitutional and 
constitutional 
  
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2015] GUIDELINES FOR AVOIDING PITFALLS 337 
TABLE 5 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Unconstitutional – By Federal Court 
FEDERAL COURT CASE NAME 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit 
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 
1976) 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit 
Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003) 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit 
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 (5th 
Cir. 1981) 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit 
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 
(9th Cir. 1997) 
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TABLE 6 
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances Found Constitutional – By Federal Court 
FEDERAL COURT CASE NAME 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit 
Schliefer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 
F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998) 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit 
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. 1993) 
U.S. District Court, 
M.D. Pennsylvania 
Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 
1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 
District of Columbia 
Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) 
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TABLE 7 
Provisions Contained in All of the Juvenile Curfew Ordinances 
 Exemption Penalty 
Case Name **** 
Parent or 
Guardian 
**** 
Other 
Adult 
Engaged in 
or Traveling 
to/from 
Employment 
 
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 
936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) 
X    
Alves v. Justice Court of 
Chico Judicial Dist., Butte 
County, 306 P.2d 601 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1957) 
X  X  
Hayes v. Municipal Court of 
Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 74 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
    
In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385 
(Haw. 1973) 
X    
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 
514 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973) 
X  X  
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 
545 F.2d 815 (2d Circ. 1976) 
X X  X 
In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 
(Ohio C.P. 1978) 
X X X X 
W.J.W. v. State of Florida 
356 So.2d 48 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1978) 
X  X  
Johnson v. City of 
Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 
(5th Circ. 1981) 
X X  X 
T.F. v. State of Florida, 431 
So.2d 342 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1983) 
X X   
S.W. v. State of Florida, 431 
So.2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983) 
X X X  
McCollester v. City of 
Keene, 586 F.Supp 1381 
(D.N.H. 1984) 
X X X  
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City of Wadsworth v. 
Owens, 536 N.E.2d 67 
(Wadsworth Municipal 
Court, Ohio 1987) 
X X  X 
In re Frank O., 201 
Cal.App.3d 1041 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1988) 
X X   
K.L.J. v. State of Florida, 
581 So.2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1991) 
X X X  
Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 
599 (Md. 1992) 
X  X X 
Nunez by Nunez v. City of 
San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th 
Circ. 1997) 
X X X X 
Betancourt v. Town of West 
New York, 769 A.2d 1065 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001) 
X  X X 
Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 
171 (2d Cir. 2003) 
X X X X 
*State of Florida v. J.P., 907 
So.2d 1101 (Fla. 2004)  
XX XX XX XX 
City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 
P.3d 1111 (Wash. 2004) 
X X X X 
Hodgkins v. Peterson (not 
reported in F.Supp.2d) 
No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 
2004 WL 1854194 (S.D. Ind. 
July 23, 2004) 
X X  X 
Commonwealth v. Weston, 
913 N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 2009) 
X  X X 
Anonymous v. City of 
Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593 
(N.Y.2009) 
X X X  
City of Maquoketa v. Russell 
& Campbell, 484 N.W.2d 
179 (Iowa 2009) 
X X X  
People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 
498, 503 (Cal.App.2d Supp. 
1945) 
X X   
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City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 
220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1966) 
X X   
In the matter of Nancy C., 28 
Cal. App. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1972) 
X X   
People v. Chambers, 335 
N.E.2d 612 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1975) 
X X X X 
Bykofsky v. Borough of 
Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 
1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975) 
X X X X 
People in Interest of J.M., 
768 P.2d 219 (Col. 1989) 
X X   
City of Panora v. Simmons, 
445 N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989) 
X X X X 
Village of Deerfield v. 
Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) 
X X X X 
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 
(5th Cir. 1993) 
X X X X 
In the Matter of Appeal in 
Maricopa Country, 887 P.2d 
599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
X X   
Schliefer by Schleifer v. City 
of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 
843 (4th Cir. 1998) 
X X X X 
Hutchins v. District of 
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) 
X X X X 
State v. T.M., A.N. & D.N., 
761 So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000) 
X X X  
Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 
446 (W.Va. 2000) 
X  X X 
State of Idaho v. John Doe, 
231 P.3d 1016 (Id. 2010) 
X   X 
*Two cases consolidated into one and counted as two cases 
****Accompaniment with children by parent or guardian, or other adult 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
342 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 8:301 
TABLE 8 
Exemptions in Curfew Ordinance Found Unconstitutional 
 Exemptions 
Case Name Exercising 
Fundamental 
Right 
Emergency 
Errand 
On the 
Sidewalk 
Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 
936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1898) 
 X  
Alves v. Justice Court of Chico 
Judicial Dist., Butte County, 306 
P.2d 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) 
   
Hayes v. Municipal Court of 
Oklahoma City, 487 P.2d 74 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) 
   
In re Doe, 513 P.2d 1385 (Haw. 
1973) 
   
City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 
P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1973) 
   
Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 
545 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1976) 
   
In re Mosier, 394 N.E.2d 368 
(Ohio C.P. 1978) 
   
W.J.W. v. State of Florida 356 
So.2d 48 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978) 
   
McCollester v. City of Keene, 
586 F.Supp 1381 (D.N.H. 1984) 
X   
Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 
658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) 
 X  
T.F. v. State of Florida, 431 
So.2d 342 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983) 
   
S.W. v. State of Florida, 431 
So.2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983) 
   
City of Wadsworth v. Owens, 
536 N.E.2d 67 (Wadsworth 
Municipal Court, Ohio 1987) 
   
In re Frank O., 201 Cal.App.3d 
1041 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) 
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K.L.J. v. State of Florida, 581 
So.2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) 
   
Brown v. Ashton, 611 A.2d 599 
(Md. 1992) 
   
Nunez by Nunez v. City of San 
Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Circ. 
1997) 
 X  
Betancourt v. Town of West 
New York, 769 A.2d 1065 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
 X  
Ramos v. Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 
(2d Cir. 2003) 
 X  
*State of Florida v. J.P., 907 
So.2d 1101 (Fla. 2004) 
XX XX XX 
City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 
P.3d 1111 (Wash. 2004) 
 X X 
Hodgkins v. Peterson (not 
reported in F.Supp.2d) 
No. 1:04-CV-569-JDT-TAB, 
2004 WL 1854194 (S.D. Ind. 
July 23, 2004) 
X X  
Commonwealth v. Weston, 913 
N.E.2d 832 (Mass. 2009)  
X X X 
Anonymous v. City of 
Rochester, 915 N.E.2d 593 
(N.Y.2009) 
X X  
City of Maquoketa v. Russell & 
Campbell, 484 N.W.2d 179 
(Iowa 2009) 
   
*Two cases consolidated into one and counted as two cases 
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TABLE 9 
Exemptions in Curfew Ordinance Found Constitutional 
 Exemptions 
Case Name Exercising 
Fundamental 
Right 
Emergency 
Errand 
On the 
Sidewalk 
People v. Walton, 161 P.2d 498, 
503 (Cal.App.2d Supp. 1945) 
   
City of Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 
220 N.E.2d 126 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1966) 
   
In the matter of Nancy C., 28 
Cal. App. 3d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1972) 
 X  
People v. Chambers, 335 N.E.2d 
612 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) 
   
Bykofsky v. Borough of 
Middletown, 401 F.Supp. 1242 
(M.D. Pa. 1975) 
X X X 
People in Interest of J.M., 768 
P.2d 219 (Col. 1989) 
   
City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 
N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989) 
X   
Village of Deerfield v. 
Greenberg, 550 N.E.2d 12 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1990) 
   
Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 
(5th Cir. 1993) 
X X X 
In the Matter of Appeal in 
Maricopa Country, 887 P.2d 599 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) 
 X  
Schliefer by Schleifer v. City of 
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 
(4th Cir. 1998) 
X X X 
Hutchins v. District of 
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) 
X X X 
State v. T.M., A.N. & D.N., 761 
So.2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2000) 
X X X 
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Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 
446 (W.Va. 2000) 
X X  
State of Idaho v. John Doe, 231 
P.3d 1016 (Id. 2010) 
 X  
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